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ARGUMENTS 
CBM and State Farm received a Brief from WCF. No other briefs from 
Antonio or the Commission were filed with this court or received by CBM and 
State Farm. As a result, CBM/State Farm's arguments here are in reply to the 
Brief filed by WCF. 
The Issues and Arguments 
As an initial observation, WCF appears to lump all of CBM/State Farm's 
arguments under the issue of "substantial evidence." This clearly does not 
represent a fair reading of the issues and arguments presented by CBM and State 
Farm in their Brief of the Appellants. As a result, CBM and State Farm ask the 
court to also consider their issues and arguments which extend beyond "substantial 
evidence" and to note that WCF failed to address these other issues and arguments 
in their Brief. 
The Medical Evidence Cited by WCF 
In its Brief on page 3, WCF concedes that the ALJ's findings in her Interim 
Order did not inform the Panel that Antonio was free of left knee pain leading up 
to the February 12, 2009 accident (on February 11, 2009 or February 12, 2009). 
As noted by WCF, the ALJ was "silent" about Antonio's left knee condition during 
this period of time. In an attempt to fill the void left by this silence, WCF places 
much stock in Dr. Goucher's medical note dated March 4, 2009 that indicated the 
1 
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left knee injection he provided on February 9, 2009 "worked for about a week." 
R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, Exhibit 6, page 58. WCF argues that 
this medical evidence (which was cited three times in the medical records) could 
not have confused the Panel because "about a week" could have been interpreted to 
mean only the 3 days following Dr. Goucher's injection leading up to the February 
12, 2009 accident. Aside from the unreasonableness of this assertion, the Panel 
was clearly left to determine the period of time during which the injection was 
effective in relationship to the February 12, 2009 accident because the ALJ did not 
provide this information to them. Based on Dr. Goucher's comments, the Panel 
may have been led to believe that the February 12, 2009 accident resulted in a 
minimal increase in pain. Indeed, the Panel described "some increased left knee 
pain" following Antonio's February 12, 2009 accident and noted that the February 
12,2009 incident was "minor" with some "increased pain for perhaps 15 minutes." 
R., pages 125-126. This hardly demonstrates a keen understanding of Antonio's 
testimony during which he stated in no uncertain terms that his left knee pain 
escalated from zero to "7 or 8" at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. 
Conspicuously absent from WCF's argument, Dr. Goucher also indicated on 
March 4, 2009 that Antonio "was feeling really good but then slowly started to get 
bad over the last couple of weeks." R., page 186, Joint Medical Record Exhibits, 
Exhibit 6, page 58. [emphasis supplied] This would have placed the initial 
2 
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deterioration of Antonio's left knee pain after the February 12, 2009 accident 
(around February 18,2009) thereby minimizing the effect of the February 12, 2009 
accident on Antonio's left knee pain. Again, this comment by Dr. Goucher only 
serves to obfuscate the profound impact of the February 12, 2009 accident despite 
the absolute numbing effect of the February 9,2009 injection, and does not support 
WCF's argument that when Dr. Goucher said "about a week," the Panel was 
provided an adequate description of Antonio's left knee pain levels from the 
February 9, 2009 injection to the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. Dr. 
Goucher's ultimate conclusions about whether a new injury occurred on February 
12, 2009 (ambiguous as they are, but upon which WCF also affords great weight) 
were certainly not based on Antonio's clear, unrefuted testimony at hearing, and 
therefore, provided no real insight to the Panel about the effect of the February 9, 
2009 injection and intense left knee pain caused by the February 12, 2009 accident 
despite the total numbing effect of the injection. 
The only other medical evidence cited by WCF in support of the Panel's 
conclusions is Dr. Marble's opinion. However, Dr. Marble did not make note in 
his report of the effect of the injection leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident 
and the significant increase in pain at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. 
Instead, Dr. Marble incorrectly observed that Antonio "had remained symptomatic 
with a marginal outcome following his knee surgery" and simply felt "a twinge of 
3 
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pain in his left knee" at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. R., page 186, 
Joint Medical Record Exhibits, pages 72 and 75. Again, this information, which 
was markedly inconsistent with Antonio's sworn testimony, failed to inform the 
Panel about what really happened with Antonio's left knee pain leading up to and 
at the time of the February 12,2009 accident. 
As a further example of WCF's struggle to minimize the ALJ's failure to 
provide the Panel complete information about the February 12, 2009 accident, 
WCF twice noted in its Brief (on pages 2 and 6) that Antonio's left knee pain 
returned to its "baseline" after the February 12, 2009 accident. WCF defined 
"baseline" as Antonio's "pre-injection status." This editorial remark appears 
nowhere in the medical records and illustrates the intrinsic problem with the ALJ's 
refusal to include in her findings to the Panel a clear understanding that Antonio's 
"baseline" pain prior to the February 12, 2009 accident was zero. Notably, Dr. 
Marble in his report simply referred to a return to "preinjury status" following the 
February 12, 2009 accident and made no observation that Antonio's pain before 
the February 12, 2009 accident was zero. R., page 186, Joint Medical Record 
Exhibits, page 75. When the Panel noted a return to "baseline" in their report, they 
were referring to "continued and increasing pain interfering with work and 
(Antonio's) quality of life" leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident. R., page 
127. As demonstrated by the uncontroverted testimony at hearing, Antonio's 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
baseline pain leading up to the February 12, 2009 accident was zero, and he never 
returned to a zero pain level after the February 12, 2009 accident. This is 
information which is enormously significant considering Dr. Goucher's prediction 
of a period of no left knee pain after the February 9, 2009 injection for a period of 
at least two weeks (as stated by Antonio in his testimony). Given that the February 
12, 2009 accident interrupted this period of pain relief and because Antonio's left 
knee pain never returned to zero after the February 12, 2009 accident, the 
significant effect of this accident was improperly minimized by WCF, the ALJ, 
and the Board. If the ALJ had provided to the Panel in her findings a complete 
description of Antonio's left knee pain leading up to and at the time of the 
February 12,2009 accident, the Panel's concept of "baseline" prior to the February 
12, 2009 accident may have been appreciably different. Because of the ALJ's 
failure to include Antonio's unrefuted testimony, the Panel never had an 
opportunity to evaluate it in arriving at their conclusions. 
The Board's Rationale 
As noted by WCF, the Board summarily concluded that "temporary pain 
relief due to the injection is not dispositive of a separate injury." R., page 183. On 
its face, this statement ignores the pronounced increase in left knee pain at the time 
of the February 12, 2009 accident despite this "temporary pain relief." Further, the 
Board provided no medical evidence or legal support to explain how it could arrive 
5 
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at such a specific conclusion. The Panel certainly did not provide this opinion 
because it was not fairly apprised of the effect of the February 9, 2009 injection 
and the significant increase in Antonio's left knee pain when the February 12,2009 
accident occurred. Mostly, the Board's presumptive statement defines the essence 
of CBM/State Farm's arguments because such a statement flies in the face of the 
Commission's requirement to fairly and accurately adjudicate the claim based on 
findings which are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah App. 1991). By 
simply relying on the Panel's ultimate conclusion that Antonio did not suffer a new 
injury on February 12, 2009, the Board committed the same error as the ALJ by 
predicating its order on a medical opinion founded on an incomplete assessment of 
unrefuted facts and then filling in the blanks with unsupported assumptions. 
The Effect of the ALJ's Findings on Medical Causation 
The ALJ's failure (as admitted by WCF) to provide the Panel with Antonio's 
unrebutted testimony that his left knee pain shot from zero up to 7-8 at the time of 
his February 12, 2009 accident was a significant omission which left the Panel to 
develop the evidence without the benefit of Antonio's own words at hearing. 
Because of this omission, the Panel's medical opinion concerning medical 
causation was distorted by the ALJ's inaccurate description of Antonio's left knee 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pain in the days leading up to and at the time of the February 12, 2009 accident. 
WCF's attempt to support the Panel's conclusions with inaccurate and incomplete 
medical evidence does not change the importance of the ALJ's (and the Board's) 
omission. 
Medical causation is an integral component in determining the 
compensability of the February 12, 2009 accident. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Considering that the ALJ based her final order largely 
on the Panel's report concerning medical causation (and that the Board 
subsequently supported this order), the ALJ's decision to leave out in her findings 
to the Panel key, unrebutted hearing testimony provided by Antonio under oath in 
spite of CBM/State Farm's objections cannot be excused, and constituted a failure 
by the ALJ to serve as fact-finder to the Panel, an abuse of the ALJ's discretion, 
and an abrogation of CBM/State Farm's due process rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for all the reasons included in the Brief of the 
Appellants, CBM and State Farm request that the portion of the Order on Motion 
for Review and Order of Remand of the Board dated May 31,2011 which affirmed 
the ALJ's award of medical benefits against CBM and State Farm be reversed, that 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated February 23, 2011 be 
set aside (concerning the ALJ's award of medical benefits and interest against 
7 
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CBM and State Farm), that CBM/State Farm's objections to the Medical Panel 
Report dated December 10, 2010 be sustained, that the ALJ's order requiring CBM 
and State Farm to pay for Antonio's medical expenses with interest be reversed, 
that a hearing be ordered to clarify the Medical Panel Report dated December 10, 
2010, and/or that further evidence as requested herein be submitted to the Panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
Respectfully submitted this '&~~ day of February, 2012. 
RUEGSEGGER SIMONS SMITH & STERN, LLC 
B,S>SC—« 
Jeff Francis, (#11370) 
743 Horizon Court, Suite 103 
Grand Junction, CO 81506 
Telephone: 970.263.0500 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellants 
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Court of Appeals of Utah, 
Roberta N. ADAMS, Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION, Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, and Unicorp, Respondents. 
No.900597-CA. 
Nov. 5,1991. 
Workers' compensation claimant sought judi-
cial review of decision of Industrial Commission 
denying her benefits as result of her alleged repetit-
ive motion syndrome. The Court of Appeals, Bench 
, P.J., held that Industrial Commission did not suffi-
ciently indicate factual basis for its decision merely 
by summarizing contradictory evidence presented, 
without in any way indicating which evidence it 
found to be more credible, and stating in conclusory 
terms that preponderance of medical evidence es-
tablished that claimant's symptoms were not work 
related 
Vacated and remanded. 
WestHeadnotes 
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413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
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413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.1 k. In General; Ques-
tions of Law or Fact. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 413kl939) 
Question of whether Industrial Commission's 
findings were sufficiently detailed to permit mean-
ingful appellate review was legal determination that 
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[2] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A ©=* 
486 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
!5Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
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15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
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U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
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15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
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ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15A1V(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak484 Findings 
15Ak486 k. Sufficiency. Most Cited 
Cases 
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steps taken by agency in reaching its decision. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
14] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A €=> 
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ting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited 
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has not substantially prejudiced petitioner. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[15] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
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U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[17] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€==>485 
15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AIV Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15Ak484 Findings 
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose. 
Most Cited Cases 
Complete, accurate, and consistent findings of 
fact are essential to proper determination by admin-
istrative agency. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[18] Administrative Law and Procedure 15A 
€=^485 
15A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15A1V Powers and Proceedings of Administrat-
ive Agencies, Officers and Agents 
15AIV(D) Hearings and Adjudications 
15 Ak484 Findings 
15Ak485 k. Necessity and Purpose. 
Most Cited Cases 
Factual findings are integral part of logical pro-
cess that administrative tribunal must go through in 
reaching a decision. U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[19] Workers1 Compensation 413 €^1939.2 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12A Questions of Law or Fact, 
Findings, and Verdict 
413kl939 Review of Decision of De-
partment, Commission, Board, Officer, or Arbitrat-
or 
413kl939.2 k. Review of Fact 
Questions in General. Most Cited Cases 
Any doubt as to whether: workers' compensa-
tion claimant was prejudiced by Industrial Commis-
sion's failure to make adequate factual findings sup-
porting its denial of benefits would be resolved in 
claimant's favor in case in which evidence was not 
clear and uncontroverted. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16 
(4). 
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15 A Administrative Law and Procedure 
15AV Judicial Review of Administrative De-
cisions 
15AV(F) Determination 
15Ak816 k. Annulment, Vacation or Set-
ting Aside of Administrative Decision. Most Cited 
Cases 
As general rule, appropriate relief for agency's 
feilure to make adequate findings is to vacate order 
complained of and to order agency to make more 
adequate findings in support of, and more fully ar-
ticulate reasons for, die determination which it 
made. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l6(4). 
[21] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>1935 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XV1 Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)12 Scope and Extent of Re 
view in General 
413kl935 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Showing Error. Most Cited Cases 
Absent adequate findings, there is no presump-
tion that Industrial Commission's decision denying 
workers' compensation benefits was correct. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
[22] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1951 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi 
tion of Proceeding 
413kl951 k. Further Proceedings Be-
fore Board, Commission, or Trial Court Most Cited 
Cases 
Upon vacation of Industrial Commission's or-
der denying workers1 compensation benefits, based 
on Commission's failure to make adequate findings 
in support of its decision, Commission was free to 
deny benefits or grant benefits as might be dictated 
by its new findings and conclusions of law. 
U.C.A.1953,63-46b-16(4). 
*3 Linda M. Barclay (argued), Howard, Lewis & 
Petersen, Provo, for petitioner. 
Richard Sumsion (argued), Salt lake City, for 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
Benjamin J. Simms, Salt Lake City, for Industrial 
Com'nofUtah. 
Before BENCH, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and 
ORME,JJ. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Roberta Adams seeks review of the 
Industrial Commission's decision to deny her bene-
fits under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 
Law, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-2-1 to -65 (1988). We 
vacate the Commission's order. 
FACTS 
Adams worked as a telemarketer for Unicorp. 
Her duties consisted primarily of dialing telephone 
numbers and talking on the telephone while sitting 
at a desk. She was not equipped with a headset or 
any type of automatic dialing equipment She was 
required to dial manually and hold the receiver to 
her ear and mouth. After working at Unicorp for 
approximately one year, Adams left Unicorp to 
seek medical attention for debilitating pain she 
claimed had developed gradually as a result of her 
employment. In general, Adams now claims that 
the repetitive motion of calling on a manual phone 
and holding the phone to her mouth and ear caused 
her neck pain, neck stiflhess, muscle spasm, pain in 
her right arm and shoulder, a "pins and needles" 
sensation and numbness in her right shoulder and 
arm, and fatigue. 
When Adams informed her supervisor of her 
pain, he referred her to his chiropractor, Dr. Robert 
Pope, for treatment. Dr. Pope examined her and 
diagnosed her as having "cervico-brachial syn-
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drome, carpal tunnel syndrome, myofascitis, and 
brachial neuralgia." Adams's condition was sub-
sequently described by Dr. Pope as "repetitive mo-
tion syndrome." Dr. Pope also indicated that he be-
lieved there was a very high probability that 
Adams's condition resulted from her job duties. 
Adams then began to see another chiropractor, 
Dr. Arnold Otterson, whose office was closer to her 
home. Dr. Otterson diagnosed Adams as having 
acute traumatic cervico-brachial syndrome with as-
sociated brachial neuralgia. Dr. Otterson likewise 
described Adams's condition as repetitive motion 
syndrome. He treated.her for several months and 
her condition improved. Dr. Otterson indicated to 
the Industrial Commission that in his professional 
opinion, Adams's "condition was directly related to 
her employment due to repetitive use of the phone." 
Adams was next seen and evaluated by Dr. 
Richard Jackson, an orthopedic surgeon. His evalu-
ation indicated that Adams was suffering from a de-
generative C5-6 disc. Inasmuch as Dr. Jackson did 
not deal with head and neck problems, he referred 
Adams to Dr. Joseph R. Watkins, a neurologist Dr. 
Watkins diagnosed Adams as having "work related 
cervical strain with some head discomfort and right 
shoulder discomfort" and "stress syndrome with 
multiple other symptoms, essentially resolved with 
resolution of work." 
The Workers' Compensation Fund (the Fund) 
required Adams to undergo an independent medical 
evaluation by Dr. Edward Spencer. Dr. Spencer ob-
served from the medical records that Adams had 
spondylosis of the C4-5 and C5-6 disc with narrow-
ing at the C5-6 level. He also observed a narrowed 
L4-5 and L5-S1 disc with osteophyte formation 
from L5 at the L5-S1 level. Dr. Spencer diagnosed 
Adams as having probable "conversion disorder," 
"chronic cervical and lumbar disc disease," " chon-
dromalacia of the patello-femoral joint," and " 
obesity and poor conditioning." He further found 
that her major problem was psychological and did 
not require any additional medical or surgical treat-
ment for her condition. 
The Fund then required Adams to be examined 
by Dr. Leonard W. Jarcho, the *4 former head of 
the Neurology Department at the University of 
Utah. Dr. Jarcho concluded that Adams did not 
have any neurological problem that he could identi-
fy. He also indicated that he believed that the min-
imal orthopedic problem was not connected to 
Adams's complaints or her prior employment. Dr. 
Jarcho described Adams's reactions, activities and 
movements during the examination as "strange," 
and concluded that Adams was in need of psychiat-
ric diagnosis and treatment 
As directed by the Fund, Adams was then ex-
amined by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist, 
who was assisted by Dr. Leslie M. Cooper, a clinic-
al psychologist. Dr. McCann concluded that Adams 
suffered from a personality disorder and did not 
have any physical impairment or other problems as-
sociated with her employment, but that her com-
plaints were motivated by a desire to obtain com-
pensation. 
A hearing was then held where the foregoing 
conflicting diagnoses were presented to an adminis-
trative law judge (A.L.J.). The A.L.J. denied bene-
fits. Adams appealed the A U . ' s decision to the 
Commission, which affirmed the decision and ad-
opted the findings and conclusions of the A.L J . as 
its own. Adams now seeks review of the Commis-
sion's decision. 
Adams presents three claims for our determina-
tion: (1) the Commission's findings and conclusions 
should be reversed because they are insufficient as 
a matter of law, (2) the Commission's factual find-
ings are not supported by substantial evidence, and 
(3) her condition constitutes a compensable condi-
tion under Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 
P.2d 330 (Utah App.1990) (interpreting Allen v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986)). Inas-
much as we find that the Commission's findings are 
insufficient and order additional findings, we do not 
address points (2) and (3). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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Our review of the Commission's denial of be-
nefits is governed by the Utah Administrative Pro-
cedures Act (UAPA). UAPA provides, in relevant 
part: 
TLw appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been sub-
stantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(h) the agency action is (iv) otherwise arbit-
rary or capricious, 
Utah Code A i 16b 16(4) (1990). 
[1] Adams claims that she is entitled to relief 
under subsection (h). FNl The question of whether 
the Commission's action constitutes arbitrary action 
for want of adequate findings is governed by our 
determination of whether this court is able to con-
duct a meaningful review. Whether the findings are 
adequate is therefore a legal determination that re-
quires no deference to the Commission. 
FN I. Adams also claims the following sub 
sections of section 63-46b-16(4) constitute 
grounds for relief: 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied die law; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a de-
termination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court 
Inasmuch as we reverse the Commis-
sion's order because its failure to make 
adequate findings constituted arbitrary 
action warranting relief under subsection 
(h), we need not address the standards of 
review for subsections (c), (d), and (g). 
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS 
[2] An administrative agency must make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law that are ad-
equately detailed so as to permit meaningful appel-
late review. 
In order for us to meaningfully review the find-
ings of the Commission, the findings must be 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidi-
ary facts to disclose the steps by which the ulti-
mate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Acton v. Deliran, 737 P 2 d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979)).... *5 [T]he failure of an 
agency to make adequate findings of fact in ma-
terial issues renders its findings " arbitrary and 
capricious " unless the evidence is "clear, uncon-
troverted and capable of only one conclusion." 
Id. (quoting Kinhella v. Bough, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm\ 800 P2d 330, 
335 (Utah App.1990), cert denied, 815 P 2d 241 
(Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly described 
the detail required in administrative findings in or-
der for findings to be deemed adequate. 
[An administrative agency] cannot discharge its 
statutory responsibilities without making findings 
of fact on all necessary ultimate issues under the 
governing statutory standards. It is also essential 
that [an administrative agency] make subsidiary 
findings in sufficient detail that the critical subor-
dinate factual issues are highlighted and resolved 
in such a fashion as to demonstrate that there is a 
logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclu-
sions. The importance of complete, accurate, and 
consistent findings of fact is essential to a proper 
determination by an administrative agency. To 
that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual 
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conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and 
law, are reached. See generally, Rucker v. Dalton, 
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Without such 
findings, this Court cannot perform its duty of re-
viewing [an administrative agency's] order in ac-
cordance with established legal principles and of 
protecting the parties and the public from arbit-
rary and capricious administrative action. 
Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
[3][4][5] If agency findings reveal the steps 
taken by the agency in reaching its decision, the 
failure to disclose a specific subsidiary finding may 
or may not be fatal to the agency's decision. A find-
ing may be implied if it is clear from the record, 
and therefore apparent upon review, that the finding 
was actually made as part of the tribunal's decision. 
See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-788, (Utah 
1991) FN2 ^re m ay n o t m e r e iy assume, however, 
that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. The 
party wishing to defend an agency decision must 
cany its burden of showing that the undisclosed 
finding was actually made. 
FN2. In so stating, we acknowledge that 
our ruling in Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335, a 
pre~UAPA case, that material subsidiary 
findings may not be implied is limited un-
der UAPA and the supreme court's lan-
guage in Ramirez, UAPA recognizes the 
possibility of implied factual findings. See 
section 63-46b-16(4)(g). An agency de-
cision may therefore be upheld under 
UAPA despite the absence of express writ-
ten findings regarding a material fact if the 
reviewing court can determine that the ma-
terial finding was in fact made, although 
not expressly written. 
For this Court to sustain an order, the findings 
must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that 
the Commission has properly arrived at the ulti-
mate factual findings and has properly applied 
the governing rules of law to those findings.... It 
is not the prerogative of this Court to search the 
record to determine whether findings could have 
been made by the Commission to support its or-
der, for to do so would be to usurp the function 
with which the Commission is charged. 
Mountain States Legal Found v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047,1052 (Utah 1981). 
[6] The findings made by the A.LJ. and adop-
ted by the Commission in the present case are inad-
equate in that they do not disclose the steps taken 
by the Commission in reaching its decision to deny 
Adams benefits. The Commission's "findings" 
amount to the following single conclusory state-
ment as to causation: "The preponderance of med-
ical evidence in this case establishes that the applic-
ant's various listed symptoms are not related to her 
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp." 
[7] Because the Commission concluded that 
Adams failed to prove causation, the Commission 
denied her benefits. The Commission correctly in-
dicated in its adopted conclusions of law that causa-
tion is one of the ultimate factual conclusions that 
must *6 be proven by a claimant See, e.g., Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
However, the Commission's conclusion that Adams 
failed to prove causation, without supporting find-
ings, is arbitrary. "Administrative bodies may not 
rely upon findings that contain only ultimate con-
clusions." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23, 31 (Utah App.1991). See also Vali 
Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of Health 
Care Financing, 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah 
App.I990) (statement of ultimate facts alone was 
essentially pro forma). Cf Mountain States Legal 
Found, 636 P.2d at 1052 ("Ultimate findings ... 
must be sustained if there are adequate subordinate 
findings to support them"). Given the numerous 
legal and factual questions regarding causation in 
this case,FhD the Commission's solitary finding 
that Adams failed to prove causation does not give 
the parties any real indication as to the bases for its 
decision and the steps taken to reach it, nor does it 
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FN3. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
35-2-27(28) (1988); Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P 2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
[8][9] While the puiported "Findings of Fact" 
written by the A.L.J. contain an informative sum-
mary of the evidence presented, such a rehearsal of 
contradictory evidence does not constitute findings 
of fact In order for a finding to truly constitute a 
"finding of fact," it must indicate what the A.LJ. 
determines in fact occurred, not merely what the 
contradictory evidence indicates might have oc-
curred. "[I]t is the responsibility of the administrat-
ive law judge to resolve factual conflicts." Lan-
caster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P2d 237, 241 (Utah 
1987). 
As is apparent in the recitation of the various 
diagnoses presented to the A.L J., the doctors each 
had differing explanations for Adams's medical 
condition and whether it was caused by her employ-
ment The evidence did not merely indicate two 
possible versions of a fact whereby we could con-
clude that the denial of benefits necessarily indic-
ates that the Commission accepted one version over 
another. The evidence shows several possible con 
figurations and degrees of injury and/or disease, if 
any, and the causes, if any, thereby creating a mat 
rix of possible factual findings. A mere summary of 
the conflicting evidence in this case therefore does 
not give a clear indication of the A.L.J/s or the 
Commission's view as to what in fact occurred. 
Since we cannot even determine why the Commis-
sion found there was no causation shown, we 
clearly cannot assume that the Commission actually 
made any of the possible subsidiary findings. The 
findings are therefore inadequate. 
[10] In order for this court to address the errors 
claimed by Adams, we must have findings that in-
dicate respectively (1) the issues decided, see sec-
tion 63-46b-16(4Xc); (2) the legal interpretations 
and applications made, see section 63-46b-16(4Xd); 
and (3) the subsidiary factual findings in support of 
Page 9 
the decision, see section 63-46b-16(4)(g). A simple 
conclusion that Adams failed to prove medical 
causation does not contain any of the foregoing in-
formation. 
[II] At a minimum, there should have been a 
finding in the present case identifying the occupa-
tional disease or injury, if any, suffered by Adams. 
The Commission could not logically conclude that 
Adams's medical condition, if any, was not caused 
by her employment without first establishing what 
her medical condition was.1*14 This it failed to do. 
The Commission's findings of fact simply do not 
"resolve all issues of material fact necessary to jus-
tify the conclusions of law and judgment entered 
thereon." Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 673 V2d 
590,601 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted). 
FN4. See, e,g„ Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335 
(error for A.LJ. to apply higher standard 
required of applicants with pre-existing 
conditions that contributed to the injury 
without first finding that the applicant had 
a pre-existing condition which contributed 
to the injury). 
[12] The Commission should have also given 
some explanation, factual or legal, as to how 
Adams failed to prove causation. *7 An applicant 
widi a pre-existing condition must prove both legal 
and medical causation. See Allen, 729 P.2d at 
25-27. The Commission relied upon Allen, but its 
findings do not make it clear whether it believed 
that Adams failed to prove medical or legal causa-
tion. Both issues were apparently involved in this 
matter. Inasmuch as our standard of review varies 
depending upon whether Adams failed to prove leg-
al or medical causation, the Commission's failure to 
identify whether Adams failed to prove legal or 
medical causation prevents us from reviewing that 
conclusion. 
[13] When multiple conflicting versions of the 
facts create a matrix of possible factual findings, 
we are unable on appeal to assume that any given 
finding was in fact made. See, e.g., Carton v. 
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Carlton, 756 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App.1988) (finding 
giving only a lump sum total valuation of all marit-
al property was inadequate to permit review of dis-
puted valuations of individual marital assets). Be-
cause of the matrix of factual possibilities in the 
present case, we are unable to conduct a meaningful 
review. We therefore hold that the Commission's 
denial of benefits based upon a solitary finding re-
garding the ultimate issue of causation fails "to dis-
close the steps by which the ultimate factual con-
clusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and law, are 
reached," id, and therefore renders the action arbit-
rary. 
PREJUDICE 
[14][15] Our conclusion that the Commission 
acted arbitrarily by failing to enter adequate find-
ings and legal conclusions does not end our inquiry, 
however. As required by section 63-46b-16(4), the 
agenc/s error must "substantially prejudice" the 
petitioner before we may grant relief. The Utah Su-
preme Court recently indicated in Morton Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 
581, 584-585 (Utah 1991), that the substantial pre-
judice language in section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an 
appellate court from granting relief if an agency er-
ror is harmless. The supreme court defined harm-
less error as being an error "sufficiently incon-
sequential that ... there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceed-
ings." Id We also note that when considering an er-
ror that is strictly of the agency's own making, such 
as failing to make adequate findings, any doubt 
about whether a petitioner was prejudiced is re-
solved in the petitioner's favor. Angell v. Board of 
Review of Indus. Comm'n, 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah 
App.1988). 
[16][17][18] We recognize as a matter of law 
the substantial prejudice inherent in the failure to 
make adequate findings when the evidence is not 
clear and uncontroverted. Nyrehn, 800 P.2d at 335. 
"The importance of complete, accurate, and con-
sistent findings of fact is essential to a proper de-
termination by an administrative agency." Milne 
Truck Lines, 720 P.2d at 1378. The findings are an 
integral part of the logical process a tribunal must 
go through in reaching a decision. See, e*g, Allred 
v. Allred, 797 ?2d 1108, 1114 (Utah App.1990) 
(final determination to be supported by adequate 
findings "made in the course of employing" the 
analytical approach established by the court on ap-
peal). Cf Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 
(Utah 1988) ("trial court must make adequate find-
ings and conclusions demonstrating that it has con-
sidered [relevant] factors" (emphasis added)). Once 
an administrative agency attempts to state its find-
ings, identify the applicable law, and articulate its 
logic, it may discover that critical facts are not 
properly before it,™5 that the law is other *8 than 
anticipated, or that its initial logic is flawed. In 
such situations, a result contrary to the initial con-
clusions of the body may be dictated. The process 
of articulation clearly enhances agency self-
discipline and protects against arbitrary and capri-
cious decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate 
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency fol-
lowed a logical process in reaching its decision. If, 
on the other hand, the agency identifies the facts, 
law, and reasoning supporting its decision, it re-
veals its logical process and the parties can be as-
sured that a logical process occured, even if it is in 
some manner flawed. 
FN5. We recognize that an administrative 
agency may hear evidence that is legally 
inadmissible under the technical rules of 
evidence; under the "residuum rule," 
however, its findings of fact cannot be 
based exclusively on such inadmissible 
evidence. "They must be supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence competent in a 
court of law." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor 
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) 
. See also Mayes v. Department of Employ-
ment Sea, 754 P.2d 989, 992 n. I (Utah 
App.1988) (explaining inconsistent stand-
ards for admitting evidence and relying 
upon evidence admitted). The process of 
articulating the critical facts gives an ad-
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ministrative agency pause to ascertain 
what evidence it may properly rely upon to 
make such findings in light of the residu-
um mle. See, e.g., Tolman, at 31-32 (at a 
minimum, issues regarding admissibility of 
evidence should have been addressed in 
the findings). 
If an agency's logical process is flawed, its 
shortcomings can be corrected on review, but only 
if the agency creates findings revealing the evid-
ence upon which it relies, the law upon which it re-
lies, and its interpretation of the law. Absent ad-
equate findings, a petitioner wishing to challenge 
an agency's factual findings will not be able to mar-
shal the evidence in support of the findings. See 
generally Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of 
the Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah 
App.1989) (party challenging factual findings of 
agency must marshal evidence in support of such 
finding and show that it is not substantial). Nor will 
a petitioner be able to challenge the agency's un-
declared interpretation of the law or its undisclosed 
logic. See, eg., State v. Lovegren, 798 P2d 767, 
771 n. 11 (Utah App.1990) (trial court's failure to 
make adequate findings "placed appellate counsel 
at a disadvantage in framing and developing their 
arguments on appear). 
[19] If findings are inadequate, this court will 
also be unable to effectively and efficiently perform 
its duty of review. "To enable this Court to determ-
ine whether an order is arbitrary and capricious, the 
Commission must make findings of fact that are 
sufficiently detailed to apprise the parties and the 
Court of the basis for the Commission's decision." 
Mountain States Legal Found, 636 P.2d at 1051 
(citations omitted). While these disadvantages may 
not be reflected in the initial outcome of the hearing 
below, they directly affect the ultimate outcome of 
the matter on review and are therefore relevant to 
the question of prejudice. It is axiomatic that die 
denial of Adams's claim without the possibility of 
meaningful review by this court, as provided for by 
UAPA, is clearly prejudicial. 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. 
Hie Fund has not established that the Commis-
sion's failure to make adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law was harmless as defined in Mor-
ton International, at 584-585. ™* We therefore re-
solve any doubt in Adams's favor and hold that 
Adams was prejudiced by die Commission's failure 
to make adequate factual findings and legal conclu-
sions. 
FN6. It is possible in some cases that the 
failure to make adequate findings is never-
theless harmless. See, e.g, Nyrehn, 800 
P.2d at 335 (failure to make findings ne-
cessary to determine whether a higher legal 
standard should be applied before applying 
the higher standard was harmless error 
when the undisputed facts of the case satis-
fied the higher standard). Cf Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah 1985) 
(even thougih findings were inadequate as 
to financial needs of wife, no remand was 
necessary because even accepting the 
wife's evidence as true, there was no abuse 
of discretion by trial court). 
RELIEF 
[20][21][22] As a general rule, the appropriate 
relief for an agency's failure to make adequate find-
ings is to vacate die order complained of and to or-
der the agency to "make more adequate findings in 
support of, and more fully articulate [the] reasons 
for, the determination ... made." Vali Convalescent 
& Care Insts., 797 P.2d at 450. However, as we 
have acknowledged herein, absent adequate find-
ings there is no presumption that the Commission's 
decision is correct The process of articulation may 
or may not cause the Commission to reach a differ-
ent decision. Since we vacate the Commission's or-
der denying benefits, it is free to deny benefits or 
grant benefits as may be dictated by its new find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law.™7 
FN7. We express no opinion on the merits 
of Adams's remaining claims inasmuch as 
they may be resolved by the Commission's 
entry of adequate findings. Her remaining 
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claims are best left for another day. 
*9 CONCLUSION 
We vacate the Commission's order denying 
Adams benefits and direct the Commission to pro-
duce adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and enter a new order. 
GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ., concur. 
UtahApp.,1991. 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n 
821P.2dl 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of Review, 
Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance Fund and Second In-
jury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 20026. 
Nov. 14,1986. 
Worker, who sustained lower back injuries 
while stacking milk crates containing four to six 
gallons of milk, sought review of an order of the In-
dustrial Commission, denying his motion for re-
view of an order of an administrative law judge 
denying his workers' compensation claim. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) finding that 
worker's injury was not "by accident" was not 
based on the evidence and, thus, was erroneous, but 
(2) worker's claim would be remanded for further 
fact finding as to whether action of worker, who 
had previous back problems, in lifting several piles 
of milk crates exceeded exertion which average 
person typically undertook in nonemployment life 
and whether medically demonstrable causal link ex-
isted between worker's lifting and injury to his back. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Hall, C.J., filed, opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, with Stewart, Associate C.J,, 
joining in the dissent. 
Stewart, Associate C.J., dissented and filed 
opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Evidence 157 €^>18 
157 Evidence 
1571 Judicial Notice 
157kl8 k. Weights, measures, and values. 
Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court took judicial notice that liquid 
milk weighs about the same as liquid water or ap-
proximately eight and one-third pounds per gallon; 
thus, four gallons of milk weigh about 33 pounds 
without the containers and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and 
crate. 
[2] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^515 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation Ma> 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)1 In General 
413k515 k. What are accidental injur-
ies in general. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of workers' compensation, key re-
quirement of an "accident" is that occurrence be 
unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where 
either cause of injury or result of exertion is differ-
ent from what would normally be expected to oc-
cur, occurrence is unplanned, unforeseen, and unin-
tended and, thus, by "accident"; clarifying Carling 
v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[3] Workers' Compensation 413 C=>515 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413V1I1(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)1 In General 
413k515 k. W h^at are accidental injur-
ies in general. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof 
of unusual event may be helpful in determining 
causal connection between injury and employment; 
however, proof of unusual event is not required as 
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an element of requirement that injury be "by acci-
dent." U.C. A. 1953, 35-1-45. 
[4J Workers' Compensation 413 C=^>515 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413 VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)1 In General 
413k515 k. What are accidental injur-
ies in general. Most Cited Cases 
An "accident," for purposes of requirement that 
injury be "by accident" to be compensable under 
Workers' Compensation Act, is an unexpected or 
unintended occurrence that may be either the cause 
or the result of an injury; abandoning Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Comm% 22 Utah 
2d 398, 545 P.2d 283; Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. 
Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah); Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 61A P.2d 104 (Utah). 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[5] Workers' Compensation 413 C^>568.2 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIH(A)5 Particular Injuries and Con-
sequences 
413k568.1 Trauma, Muscular Strains, 
and Consequences of Exertion and Overexertion 
413k568.2 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 413k568) 
Key question in workers' compensation case in 
determining causation is whether, given worker's 
body and worker's exertion, the exertion in fact 
contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[6] Workers' Compensation 413 €==>552 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)4 Aggravation of Previously 
Impaired Condition 
413k552 k. In general. Most Cited 
Workers' Compensation 413 €=>568.2 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413VIII(A)5 Particular Injuries and Con-
sequences 
413k568.1 Trauma, Muscular Strains, 
and Consequences of Exertion and Overexertion 
413k568.2 k. In general Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 413k568) 
Only those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by employment in-
creases risk of injury which worker normally faces 
in his everyday life is compensable under Workers' 
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally 
occur at work because preexisting condition results 
in symptoms which appear during work hours 
without any enhancement from the work place are 
not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
[7] Workers' Compensation 413 €=>597 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(B) Remote and Proximate Con-
sequences 
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of workers' compensation, two-
part causation test, requiring consideration of legal 
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cause and medical cause of injury, is required in de-
termining whether causal connection exists between 
injury and worker's employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 
(Utah); Sabo's Elec. Sen>. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah); 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah); Nu-
zum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 
565 P.2d 1144 (Utah); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. 
Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331; 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kais-
er Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 
(Utah); Residential and Commercial Construction 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961. 
U.CA.1953,35-145 
[8] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^553 
413 Workers1 Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(A) Nature and Character of Physical 
Harm 
413Vlli(A)4 Aggra * ation of Pi e\ iously 
Impaired Condition 
413k553 k. Necessity of accident and 
causal connection. Most Cited Cases 
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condi-
tion which contributes to injury, unusual or ex-
traordinary exertion is required to prove "legal 
causation," for purposes of two-part causation test 
for determining whether causal connection exists 
between claimant's injury and claimant's employ-
ment; where there is no preexisting condition, a 
usual or an ordinary exertion is sufficient to prove 
legal causation. U.CA.1953, 35-1-45. 
[9] Workers' Compensation 413 €^>597 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Comper nation IV!; i;> 
Be Had 
413VIII(B) Remote and Proximate Con-
sequences 
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of legal causation element of two-
part test for determining whether causal connection 
exists between claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment, precipitating exertion must be compared 
with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life of people in general, not nonemploy-
ment life of the particular claimant in question. 
U.CA.1953, 35-1-45. 
[10] Workei s'Compensaf i.« >n413C= : 597 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413VIII Injuries for Which Compensation May 
Be Had 
413VIII(B) Remote and Prox imate C on-
sequences 
413k597 k. In general. Most Cited Cases 
Under medical causation portion of two-part 
test for determining whether causal connection ex-
ists between claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment, claimant must show by evidence, opin-
ion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation led to resulting in-
jury or disability. U.CA.1953, 35-1-45. 
111! W oi ke t ! ' €« • npensati< > n 113 €= : 1390 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(M) Admissibility of Evidence 
413kl390 k. Injury arising out of and in 
course of employment. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness of em-
ployee's exertions may be relevant to medical con-
clusion of causal connection between claimant's in-
jury and claimant's employment IJ.C.A1953, 
35-1-45. 
1121 ' Vo i kei s"' C o m p en s a t i o n 413 C---'"11531,4 
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413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evid-
ence 
413XVI(N)7 Accident or Injury and Con-
sequences Thereof 
413kl531.1 Particular Injuries and 
Consequences 
413kl531.4 k. Back injuries. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 413kl533) 
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was 
not "by accident" as claimant was stacking milk 
crates was not based on the evidence and, thus, was 
erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and 
unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate of 
milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job, and no 
evidence indicated that injury was predictable or 
developed gradually as with occupational disease or 
progressive back disorder. U.C.A.1953,35-1-45. 
[13] Workers' Compensation 413 €=^1950 
413 Workers' Compensation 
413XVI Proceedings to Secure Compensation 
413XVI(T) Review by Court 
413XVI(T)13 Determination and Disposi-
tion of Proceeding 
413kl950 k. Instructions on remand. 
Most Cited Cases 
Compensation claim of worker, who had preex-
isting back problems and sustained lower back in-
juries while stacking crates containing four to six 
gallons of milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and lifting sever-
al piles of crates weighing 30 to 50 pounds in con-
fined area of cooler exceeded exertion average per-
son typically undertook in nonemployment life and 
whether there was medically demonstrable causal 
link between worker's action in lifting milk crates 
and injury to his back and, thus, ultimately, whether 
his injury "arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment." U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
*17 Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Second Injury. 
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt Lake City, 
for State Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review from 
the Industrial Commission's denial of his motion 
for review of an administrative law judge order 
denying him compensation for a back injury sus-
tained at work. For the reasons stated below, we re-
verse and remand. 
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claimant, aged 
36, was employed as night manager of Kent's 
Foods. The claimant testified to the following ver-
sion of events at a hearing before an administrative 
law judge. The claimant was working in a confined 
cooler in the store stacking crates, containing four 
to six gallons FN1 of milk, from the floor onto a 
cooler shelf. While lifting one crate to about chest 
level, he suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower 
back. He immediately set down the crate and asked 
another employee to continue stocking the shelves. 
The claimant completed the one-half hour remain-
ing in his shift doing desk work. That night the pain 
increased, and by morning his left leg felt numb. 
Four or five days later, he saw Dr. Ivan Wright 
about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during 
December were followed through with the pre-
scribed treatment of bed rest and medication. A my-
elogram finally revealed a herniated disc, and the 
claimant spent ten days in traction in the hospital in 
early January. He did not return to work. 
FN1. We take judicial notice that liquid 
milk weighs about the same as liquid water 
or approximately 8 1/3 pounds per gallon. 
Thus, four gallons of milk weigh about 33 
pounds without the containers and crate. 
Six gallons of milk weigh approximately 
50 pounds without the containers and crate. 
The claimant also testified he had a history of 
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prior back injuries, including a fall from a tele-
phone pole at age fourteen which required him to 
wear a back brace for several months, a back injur} 
in 1977 while lifting sand bags for the Logan 
School District, and another fall while working for 
that employer when he slipped on a slick concrete 
ramp and broke his coccyx. None of the prior injur 
ies resulted in prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claimant. The 
employer's report of injury describes the accident as 
"picking up freight and stocking it on shelves, lift-
ing boxes and stacking them from truck." No spe-
cific event was mentioned in the employer's report. 
The medical records of treating physicians de-
scribed the claimant's previous injuries, but omitted 
any reference to a specific incident in the cooler. 
Dr. Hannan, who examined the claimant on Decem-
ber 31, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember any 
distinct episode as having precipitated his current 
problem, however." And in a letter from Dr. Bryner 
to Dr. Wright dated January 13, 1983, the 
claimant's history was related as follows: "About 
six weeks ago, however, he was lifting material at 
work, and recalls no specific injury or stress but de-
veloped discomfort in his left groin area which ulti-
mately extended into his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that the 
claimant's injury to his back on November 23, 
1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment." It is apparent that 
the administrative law judge, using a specific epis-
ode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" be-
cause there was no identifiable *18 event that 
caused the injury and because lifting the crates of 
milk was a routine and commonplace exertion ex-
pected of the job. The administrative law judge ana-
logized the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain Co-
operative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980), 
where a gradually developed back injury was held 
to be not compensable where the condition 
worsened without the intervention of any external 
occurrence or trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting back prob-
lems and was injured as the result of an exertion 
usual and typical for his job, was injured "by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of employment" 
as required by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986) That Act, in 
pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee ... who is injured ... by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment 
... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury.... 
Id. This statute creates two prerequisites for a 
finding of a compensable injury. First, the injury 
must be "by accident." Second, the language 
"arising out of or in the course of employment" re-
quires that there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 
1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often 
failed to distinguish the analysis of the accident 
question from the discussion of causation elements. 
FN2
 As a result, this Court and the Commission are 
faced with confusing and often inconsistent preced-
ent. For this reason we now undertake a fresh look 
at the policy and historical background of the work-
ers' compensation statute in an attempt to provide a 
clear and workable rule for future application by 
the Commission. 
FN2. We note that in any of our prior opin-
ions so intermingled the causation and ac-
cident analyses that it is impossible to se-
gregate them and determine the basis for 
the Court's decision. For example, the 
opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 
P.2d 722 (Utah 1982), mixes the accident 
and causation elements in the following 
language: "It appears to be mere coincid-
ence that defendant's injury ... occurred at 
work. Defendant bears the burden of show-
ing otherwise. Proof of the causal relation-
ship of duties of employment to unexpec-
ted injury is simply lacking.... [T]he Com-
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mission's conclusion that an accident oc-
curred is without any substantive support 
in the record." Id. at 726 (footnotes omit-
ted). See also Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 
590 P.2d 328, 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pintar 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 
P.2d 414 (1963). For an example of an 
opinion which does separate the accident 
and causation analysis, see Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
I. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in the 
workers' compensation statutes. The most fre-
quently referenced authority for the definition of 
"by accident" is the case of Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), 
where the term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, uninten-
ded occurrence different from what would nor-
mally be expected to occur in the usual course of 
events.... [T]his is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened suddenly at 
one particular time and does not preclude the 
possibility that due to exertion, stress or other re-
petitive cause, a climax might be reached in such 
manner as to properly fall within the definition of 
an accident as just stated above. However, such 
an occurrence must be distinguished from gradu-
ally developing conditions which are classified as 
occupational diseases.... 
Id. at 261-62, 399 P.2d at 203 (citing Jones v. 
California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 616, 244 
P.2d 640, 642 (1952), and Purity Biscuit Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 
(1949)). Some confusion has developed as to 
whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual 
event. This issue frequently arises when the em-
ployee suffers an internal failure ™3 brought about 
by exertions in the *19 workplace. It is clear, 
however, that our cases have defined "by accident" 
to include internal failures resulting from both usu-
al and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). 
FN3. An "internal failure" refers to a cat-
egory of injuries that arise from general or-
gan or structural failure brought about by 
an exertion in the workplace. Internal fail-
ure claims evaluated by this Court include 
heart attacks, hernias, and back injuries. 
See generally, Note, Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission and Injury Compensability 
under Utah Worker's Compensation Law: 
A Just Result or Just Another "Living 
Corpse"?, 1981 UtahL.Rev. 393. 
This Court first discussed the term "by acci-
dent" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 (1922), where an acci-
dent was said to be "something out of the ordinary, 
unexpected, and definitely located as to time and 
place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. This definition 
was used to distinguish injuries which occurred 
gradually and were covered under statutory provi-
sions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in 
Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where the 
claimant suffers an internal failure the "unexpected 
result" rule of the seminal English case of Fenton v. 
Thorley, [1903] A.C. 443, 72 L.J.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 
1, is appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling ob-
served: 
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, nothing 
more is required than that the harm that the 
plaintiff has sustained shall be unexpected.... It is 
enough that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on a particu-
lar occasion is neither designed nor expected. The 
test as to whether an injury is unexpected, and so, 
if received on a single occasion, occurs 'by acci-
dent,' is that the sufferer did not intend or expect 
that injury would on that particular occasion res-
ult from what he was doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A 
Problem in The Drafting of Workmen's Compensa-
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Hon Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 328, 340 (1912) 
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Tintic 
affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previ-
ous respiratory problems were aggravated by enter-
ing a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable ac-
cident. 
After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily re-
jected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton 
v. Thorley in internal failure cases on the ground 
that the definition of "by accident" required an un-
usual occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. In-
dustrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 P. 1103 
(1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker 
who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while 
manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the 
ground that no overexertion occurred during the 
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. That decision 
was apparently overruled, however, when the Court 
embraced the "unexpected result" rule and awarded 
compensation to an employee who suffered a heart 
attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning 
the weirs to a city reservoir. Hammond v. Industrial 
Commission, 84 Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 
(1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol 
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937), where a un-
animous Court held that the employee, who had 
suffered a ruptured aorta from riding a caterpillar 
tractor over rough ground, suffered an injury "by 
accident" since the result was "an unusual, unfore-
seen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and def-
inite as to time and place. Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. 
And, in Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of bene-
fits to a claimant who had suffered from heart dis-
ease and experienced a heart attack shortly after 
moving 52 boxes weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 
28 sacks of fire clay-work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary duties. The 
Court pointed out, in dicta, that the English com-
mon law would have awarded compensation even if 
the exertions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 P.2d at 
©2012 IIUKI s, .. iv -ii. > 
235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen article, supra, the 
Court observed: 
*20 "[NJothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained shall be un-
expected.... The element of unexpectedness in-
herent in the word 'accident' is sufficiently sup-
plied ... if, though the act is usual and the condi-
tions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him 
who suffers it." 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industri-
al Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949), 
this Court explicitly adopted the English rule for 
the definition of an accident and awarded benefits 
to a claimant who unexpectedly injured his back 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a delivery 
truck-a usual and ordinary activity. See 115 Utah 
14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. After summarizing early 
Utah cases interpreting "by accident" the Court 
concluded that "since 1922 this court has uniformly 
held that an unexpected internal failure meets the 
requirements of ["by accident"] and the legislature 
by failing to amend has acquiesced in that construc-
tion " 115 Utah at 15, 201 P.2d at 968. 
The holding of Purity Biscuit also squarely em-
braced the concept that an ordinary or usual exer-
tion that results in an unexpected injury is com-
pensable. See 115 Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. 
After carefully considering the legislative purpose 
of the workers' compensation statute, prior preced-
ent, and public policy, the Court rejected the re-
quirement that proof of an unusual activity or exer-
tion be a required element of the "by accident" 
definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 967-70. 
The Court concluded that "there is nothing in the 
statute which would justify a holding that an injury 
is compensable where overexertion is shown but is 
not compensable where only ordinary exertion is 
shown, provided that in both cases it is shown that 
the exertion causes the injury." FN4 115 Utah at 19, 
201 P.2d at 970. 
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FN4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was 
questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 
19 Utah 2d 373, 431 P.2d 798 (1967), 
where the opinion erroneously stated that 
Purity Biscuit "has never been cited by this 
or any other court to support the law of 
that case." 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at 
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had 
been relied upon in decisions from the 
courts of nine other states. Alabama Tex-
tiles Prods. Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala. 
179, 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 208 (1955) 
(finding of unusual strain or exertion unne-
cessary to support conclusion that claimant 
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave 
& Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 
151-52, 296 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) ( 
Purity Biscuit cited as stating majority pos-
ition that usual exertion causing an internal 
failure may be by accident); Argonaut Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 231 
Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 
(1964) (relying upon causation rule of Pur-
ity Biscuit ); Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 
138 So.2d 308, 314 (Fla.1962) (back herni-
ation from rupture of intervertebral disc 
satisfies statutory requirement of sudden-
ness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 268 
Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 
(1964) (calls Purity Biscuit "a well-
considered workmen's compensation case" 
that supported an award where many 
factors led to the disability); Murphy v. 
Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 321 
P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably 
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant 
Stave, 227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 
439-40, and holding that a usual exertion 
may lead to a compensable injury where 
the causal relationship is established); 
Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 10 N.J. 325, 
327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) {Purity 
Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is 
an "injury by accident"); Olson v. State In-
dust. Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 
416-17, 352 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1960) 
(O'Connell, J., specially concurring) 
(dissent to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooper 
v. Vinatien, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W.2d 
747, 750-51 (1950) {Purity Biscuit cited as 
an example of the divergent viewpoints for 
defining a compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit 
was relied upon by the majority in three 
Utah cases. See Jones v. California 
Packing Co., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 
640, 642; Carting v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202; 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this 
support for the decision in Purity Bis-
cuit, the Court in Mellen concluded 
without further discussion that "[t]he 
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a 
healthy reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 
376, 431 P.2d at 800. Two years later in 
Redman Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 
(1969), the Court again questioned the 
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial 
analysis that concluded: "Purity enjoys 
the unique and doubtful distinction of 
being a living corpse." 22 Utah 2d at 
403, 454 P.2d at 286. After considering 
those cases from Utah and other jurisdic-
tions that have relied on Purity Biscuit, 
we now cannot agree that it was a 
"living corpse." Moreover, even if Pur-
ity Biscuit lay dormant, it was resurrec-
ted by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 
617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). 
*21 Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases have 
held that an internal injury may be compensable if 
it results from either a usual or unusual exertion in 
the course of employment. See, e.g., Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 
306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer caused by lifting 
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an unusually heavy beam); Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratories v. Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 
(unforeseen and unanticipated heart attack resulting 
from exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1981) (back injury resulting from shoveling coal 
compensable despite usualness of activity and pres-
ence of preexisting conditions); Painter Motor v. 
Ostler, 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury res-
ulting from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Com-
mission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) (back injury res-
ulting from carrying steel plates compensable des-
pite prior history of back disorders and ordinary 
activity); United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from 
exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA 
Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) ( 
heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. 
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 
P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver suffered heart 
attack after repeatedly climbing long steps); Resid-
ential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (back in-
jury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 
(1967) (heart distress occurring over a period of 
several months compensable despite preexisting 
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury res-
ulting from filing papers in lower drawer compens-
able). 
Despite the strong precedential support for ap-
plying the "unexpected result" rule of Purity Bis-
cuit to internal failure cases, a separate line of op-
posing authority has developed which requires 
overexertion or an unusual event to prove an injury 
occurred "by accident." Typically, these cases 
denied compensation because the claimants' ordin-
ary work duties precipitated the injury. Con-
sequently, there were no events or exertions that 
were unusual or extraordinary to qualify as "by ac-
cident." See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. 
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation 
for knee injury denied where circumstances precip-
itating the injury were commonplace and usual); 
Sabofs Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah 1982) (back injury from loading box of 
twelve radios into van not compensable); Farmer's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980) (back injury to claimant with preexisting 
condition resulting from delivery of 100-pound 
sacks not compensable since the activity was not 
unusual or unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury suffered by jan-
itor upon standing up not compensable without 
evidence that activities were unusual); Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury pre-
cipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not 
compensable without proof of an unusual event). 
These cases will not be collectively referred to as 
the Redman line of cases. 
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line 
of cases has misconstrued the historical and logical 
definition of "by accident." The Redman line of 
cases relied on the following abridged version of 
the definition of an accident found in Carling v. In-
dustrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an 
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events. " 16 Utah at 261, 399 P.2d at 
203 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). In Red-
man, the highlighted phrase was interpreted to re-
quire an unusual event before there can be an acci-
dent. This interpretation misconstrues the Carling 
decision itself and is inconsistent with the English 
definition of "by accident" used by this Court since 
1922. The key requirement of an accident under the 
*22 Carling decision, as well as prior decisions, 
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, un-
planned and unintended. The highlighted phrase 
emphasized that where either the cause of the injury 
or the result of an exertion was different from what 
would normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and 
therefore "by accident." 
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Policy considerations also militate in favor of 
rejecting the notion that the phrase "by accident" 
requires an unusual event. There is nothing in the 
term "accident" that suggests that only that which is 
unusual is accidental. See Robertson v. Industrial 
Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 163 P.2d at 335, 
338 (Wade, J., concurring; Wolfe, J., dissenting). 
An accident does not occur simply because a work-
er is injured during an unusual activity. This argu-
ment is illustrated by Professor Larson in his treat-
ise on workmen's compensation with the following 
example: 
If an employee intentionally and knowingly un-
dertakes to lift an unusual load, the cause (i.e., 
the lifting) is no more accidental than if he delib-
erately lifted a normal load. Or if a gardener de-
liberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain, 
a passerby observing him would not say that he 
was undergoing an accident merely because it is 
unusual to mow lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 
7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual distinc-
tion as being unworkable in practice. Realistically, 
it is impossible to determine what are the usual and 
normal requirements of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well as light 
ones, and work for long hours as well as short ones. 
None of these activities may be unusual or unex-
pected. Id. § 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual event 
requirement is further evidenced by comparing 
seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court. 
Compare Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(back injury to miner with previous back problems 
held to be a compensable accident despite being 
caused by shoveling coal in the usual course of em-
ployment), with Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. 
Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (no accident where worker 
with previous back problems sustained back injury 
while delivering 100-pound bags of whey); com-
pare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 
141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable accident for back 
injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) 
with Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 61A P.2d 
104 (no accident where worker sustained knee in-
jury resulting from bending to pick up small parts). 
[3] [4] We believe that the Court's real concern 
in the Redman line of cases was the presence or ab-
sence of proof of causation to support an award of 
compensation. See generally Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 
(Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed in the 
next section, the Court has developed two parallel 
lines of authority on the causation issue, one of 
which requires an unusual event in order to meet 
the statutory causation requirement. Although proof 
of an unusual event may be helpful in determining 
causation, it is not required as an element of "by ac-
cident" in section 35-1-45. "[T]he basic and indis-
pensable ingredient of 'accident' is unexpected-
ness." Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's Compens-
ation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm those 
cases which hold that an accident is an unexpected 
or unintended occurrence that may be either the 
cause or the result of an injury. We thus necessarily 
abandon the analysis of "by accident" in the Red-
man line of cases which predicates the "accident" 
determination upon the occurrence of an unusual 
event. 
II. 
The second element of a compensable accident 
requires proof of a causal connection between the 
injury and the worker's employment duties. Pitts-
burg Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 
1370 (Utah 1983). In workers' compensation *23 
cases involving internal failures, the key issue is 
usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is 
proved by the production and interpretation of med-
ical evidence either alone or together with other 
evidence. See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 
695 (Utah 1980). Because of the difficulties of dia-
gnosis of internal failures and because of the pos-
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sibility that a preexisting condition may have con-
tributed to the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases. See Lar-
son, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 
P.2d 970-71 (Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the problem 
of causation in internal failure cases by suggesting 
that the Commission use a clear and convincing 
evidence standard when an internal failure was 
caused by an exertion in the workplace. ™5 See 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 74, 138 P.2d 233, 
238 (1943). The clear and convincing evidence 
standard was rejected, however, in Lipman v. In-
dustrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 
1979), with the rationale that such a standard would 
make workers' compensation benefits nearly im-
possible to recover where the deceased suffered 
from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the 
standard to prove causal connection is preponder-
ance of the evidence. Id. 
FN5. In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of 
proof is still used where the employee suf-
fers from a preexisting condition. See 
Mann v. City of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 
592,319 N.W.2d 454,458 (1982). 
The second method that has been used to en-
sure causal connection in internal failure cases is to 
require proof that an unusual event or activity pre-
cipitated the injury. Presumably, this requirement 
was used to prevent compensating a person predis-
posed to internal failure where the preexisting con-
dition contributed more to the injury than his usual 
work activity. The following internal failure cases 
illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activ-
ity is necessary to prove causation. Billings Com-
puter Cotp. v. Tarango, 614 P.2d 104, 106-07 
(Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 
P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 1982); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 1978); Nu-
zum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 
565 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1977); Jones v. Califor-
nia Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 
(1952); Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. Dee Me-
morial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 
104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 233; see Schmidt, 617 
P.2d at 697-99 (Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-39 
(Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 799 (1967); Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, 
J., dissenting). Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exertion will 
open the floodgates for payment of benefits for all 
internal injuries that coincidentally occur at work. 
They claim that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessary to prevent the employer from becoming a 
general insurer. They argue that without the unusu-
al exertion rule, employment opportunities for per-
sons with a history or indication of physical disabil-
ity or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual ex-
ertion" rule, the claimant urges us to follow a separ-
ate line of authority that awards compensation for 
injuries that occur during usual and ordinary work-
place activity. These cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged in a 
workplace activity and where there is adequate 
evidence of medical causation. See, e.g., Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) 
(award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's 
back injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d at 695 
(compensation awarded for *24 back injuries 
arising from ordinary duties upon proof of medical 
causal connection between workplace exertions and 
the injury); Residential and Commercial Construc-
tion Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1974) (carpenter's back injury from lifting, 
bending, and twisting in the ordinary course of 
work compensable); Powers v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in 
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the normal course of employment-the Court reject-
ing the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary 
exertion); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury from fil-
ing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compens-
able); Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usu-
al exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v. Indus-
trial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-76, 431 P.2d 
at 800, that decision failed to explicitly overrule the 
usual exertion line of cases. Moreover, Residential 
and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation for usual 
workplace activity after the Mellen decision. 
Clearly, the usual exertion rule is not simply an ab-
erration in Utah law. 
When read in chronological sequence, our 
opinions demonstrate an inconsistent and confused 
approach to determining when an accident arose out 
of or in the course of employment. Much of this 
confusion can be traced to fundamental problems 
stemming from the use of the usual-unusual distinc-
tion as a means of proving causation. Larson criti-
cizes the unusual exertion requirement by itself as a 
"clumsy and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 
7-270. The problems in determining what activities 
were usual or unusual were recognized as long ago 
as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandoras 
box of difficulties ... may be opened by the refine-
ments between usual and unusual, exertion and 
overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion 
measured by the individual involved or by the in-
dustrial function performed by him or both." Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., 
concurring specially). The contents of the Pandoras 
box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the 
plethora of our cases struggling with a definition of 
a compensable accident based upon the usualness 
or ordinariness of an activity. 
Professor Larson has also criticized the usual-
unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the 
activity fails to consider that some occupations 
routinely require a usual exertion capable of caus-
ing injury. Likewise, other occupations, such as 
deskwork, require so little physical effort that an 
"unusual exertion" may be insufficient to prove that 
the resulting accident arose out of the employment. 
Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270.FN6 
FN6. Larson's observation is consistent 
with this Court's rationale for rejecting the 
unusual exertion requirement in Purity Bis-
cuit, 115 Utah at 16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
[I]f [overexertion] is the test no one will 
ever know what this court will consider 
sufficient overexertion. Also under that 
test if the work usually required by the 
job is so great that it would break the 
strongest man even he will not be able to 
recover. But if it is more than usual exer-
tion which causes the injury the employ-
ee can recover no matter how light the 
work is which causes the injury. 
Id. 
[5] Because we find the present use of the usu-
al-unusual distinction unhelpful and our prior pre-
cedent inconsistent, we take this opportunity to ex-
amine an alternative causation analysis that may 
better meet the objectives of the workers' compens-
ation laws. We are mindful that the key question in 
determining causation is whether, given this body 
and this exertion, the exertion in fact contributed to 
the injury. Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., concurring 
specially). 
[6] The language "arising out of or in the 
course of his employment" found in U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was apparently intended to 
ensure that compensation is only awarded where 
there is a *25 sufficient causal connection between 
the disability and the working conditions. The caus-
ation requirement makes it necessary to distinguish 
those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at 
work because a preexisting condition results in 
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symptoms which appear during work hours without 
any enhancement from the workplace, and (b) those 
injuries which occur because some condition or ex-
ertion required by the employment increases the 
risk of injury which the worker normally faces in 
his everyday life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine 
Co., 444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me. 1982). Only the latter 
type of injury is compensable under U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45. There is no fixed formula by which the 
causation issue may be resolved, and the issue must 
be determined on the facts of each case. 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a two-part 
causation test which is consistent with the purpose 
of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in 
determining causation. We therefore adopt that test. 
Larson suggests that compensable injuries can best 
be identified by first considering the legal cause of 
the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, 
supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-273. "Under the legal test, 
the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies 
the test of 'arising out of the employment' ... [then] 
the doctors must say whether the exertion (having 
been held legally sufficient to support compensa-
tion) in fact caused this [injury]." FN7 Larson, 
supra, § 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277. 
FN7. Cases from other jurisdictions which 
have accepted the dual-causation standard 
suggested by Larson include: Market 
Foods Distribs., Inc. v. Levenson, 383 
So.2d 726 (Fla.DistCt.App.1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease 
denied compensation where injury could 
have been triggered at any time during nor-
mal movement and exertion at work not 
greater than typical nonemployment exer-
tion); Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (claimant granted 
compensation where injury resulted from 
stress, exertion, and strain greater than that 
in everyday nonemployment life); Bryant 
v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329 
(Me. 1982) (claimant with preexisting con-
dition awarded compensation for back in-
jury resulting from fall from his stool at 
work because of increased risk of falling 
where employees moved around him at 
work); Barrett v. Herbert Eng'g, Inc., 371 
A.2d 633 (Me. 1977) (claimant with preex-
isting back condition denied compensation 
for injury resulting from working at normal 
gait since there was no work-related en-
hancement of personal risk); Mann v. City 
of Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 
(1982) (policeman with history of heart 
disease awarded compensation for heart at-
tack at home where claimant's physician 
testified that attack was caused by stress of 
police work rather than personal risk 
factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods. Co., 206 
Neb. 506, 293 N.W.2d 415 (1980) 
(claimant with preexisting heart problems 
denied compensation for heart attack 
suffered while unloading 28-pound cases 
from truck trailer despite sedentary non-
working lifestyle using objective standard 
of average worker in nonemployment life); 
Couture v. Mammoth Groceries, Inc., 116 
N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 (1976) (claimant 
with no preexisting heart problems awar-
ded benefits upon proof that lifting beef 
medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
[8] 1. Legal Cause-Whether an injury arose out 
of or in the course of employment is difficult to de-
termine where the employee brings to the work-
place a personal element of risk such as a preexist-
ing condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified 
from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear 
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-
existing disease by an industrial accident is com-
pensable...." Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967) 
(footnote omitted). To meet the legal causation re-
quirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his condi-
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tion. This additional element of risk in the work-
place is usually supplied by an exertion greater than 
that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra 
exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition 
of the employee as a likely cause of the injury, 
thereby eliminating claims for impairments result-
ing from a personal risk rather than exertions at 
work. Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson 
summarized how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
*26 If there is some personal causal contribu-
tion in the form of a [preexisting condition], the 
employment contribution must take the form of 
an exertion greater than that of nonemployment 
life.... 
If there is no personal causal contribution, that 
is, if there is no prior weakness or disease, any 
exertion connected with the employment and 
causally connected with the [injury] as a matter 
of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test 
of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from a 
preexisting condition which contributes to the in-
jury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove legal causation. Where there is no 
preexisting condition, a usual or ordinary exertion 
is sufficient.™8 
FN8. Larson highlights the difference 
between the unusual-usual exertion test 
with the rule we today adopt with the fol-
lowing examples of extreme cases in the 
heart attack area: 
Suppose X's job involves frequent lifting 
of 200-pound bags, and one such 
200-pound lift medically produces a 
heart attack. Under the old unusual-ex-
ertion rule there would be no compensa-
tion, regardless of previous heart condi-
tion. Under the suggested rule there 
would be compensation, even in the 
presence of a history of heart disease, 
because people generally do not lift 
200-pound weights as a part of nonem-
ployment life, and therefore this episode 
cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear 
and tear of life. 
Suppose Y's job involves no lifting. Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the 
job, and suppose there is medical testi-
mony that this lift caused his heart at-
tack. Under the old test, exclusively con-
cerned with the comparison between this 
employee's usual exertions and the pre-
cipitating exertion, there would be com-
pensation. Under the suggested rule the 
result would depend on whether there 
was a personal causal element in the 
form of a previously weakened heart. If 
there was not, compensation would be 
awarded, since the employment contrib-
uted something and the employee's per-
sonal life nothing to the cause of the col-
lapse. If there was [a previously 
weakened heart], compensation would 
be denied in spite of the medical causal 
contribution, because legally the person-
al causal contribution was substantial, 
while the employment added nothing to 
the usual wear and tear of life-which cer-
tainly includes lifting objects weighing 
20 pounds such as bags of golf clubs, 
minnow pails, and step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 
(footnote omitted). 
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion that the 
comparison between the usual and unusual exertion 
be defined according to an objective standard. 
"Note that the comparison is not with this employ-
ee's usual exertion in his employment but with the 
exertions of normal nonemployment life of this or 
any other person." Larson, supra, § 38.83(b), at 
7-279 (emphasis in original). See also Johns-
Manville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 
I11.2d 171, 178, 35 Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 
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606, 610 (1979) (compensation denied where the 
risk of the employment activity "is no greater than 
that to which he would have been exposed had he 
not been so employed"); Strickland v. National 
Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497, 499 
(Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk must be " 'a 
danger or risk materially in excess of that to which 
people not so employed are exposed....' " Quoting 
from City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). But see 
Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. Levenson, 383 
So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) (subjective 
test: "the employment must involve an exertion 
greater than that normally performed by the em-
ployee during his non-employment life"). Thus, the 
precipitating exertion must be compared with the 
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemploy-
ment life, not the nonemployment life of the partic-
ular worker. 
We believe an objective standard of comparis-
on will provide a more consistent and predictable 
standard for the Commission and this Court to fol-
low. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, 
the focus is on what typical nonemployment activit-
ies are generally expected of people in today's soci-
ety, not what this particular claimant is accustomed 
to doing. Typical activities and exertions expected 
of men and women in the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury, for example, include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, 
changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in 
buildings. By *27 using an objective standard, the 
case law will eventually define a standard for typic-
al "nonemployment activity" in much the way case 
law has developed the standard of care for the reas-
onable man in tort law. 
[10] 2. Medical Cause-The second part of Lar-
son's dual-causation test requires that the claimant 
prove the disability is medically the result of an ex-
ertion or injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity. The purpose of the medical cause test is to 
ensure that there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the work-related exertions and the un-
expected injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The medical causal requirement will prevent an em-
ployer from becoming a general insurer of his em-
ployees and discourage fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of causation, 
the importance of the ... medical panel becomes 
manifest. It is through the expertise of the medic-
al panel that the Commission should be able to 
make the determination of whether the injury sus-
tained by a claimant is causally connected or con-
tributed to by the claimant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., concur-
ring). Under the medical cause test, the claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that 
the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability. 
In the event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be denied. 
FN9 
FN9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usu-
alness of the employee's exertions may be 
relevant to the medical conclusion of caus-
al connection. Where the injury results 
from latent symptoms with an illness such 
as heart disease, proof of medical causa-
tion may be especially difficult. Larson's 
treatise cites many examples of cases 
where compensation claims were defeated 
because of inadequate proof of medical 
causation. See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 
7-319 to -321. Compare Guidry v. Sline In-
dus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 
(La. 1982) (heart attack triggered by stress, 
exertion, and strain greater than sedentary 
life of average worker compensable). 
III. 
[11] We now undertake to apply the foregoing 
analysis to the case before us. In reviewing findings 
of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home Builders 
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v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 
1985). 
[12] We have previously stated that the key 
element of whether an injury occurred "by acci-
dent" is whether the injury was unexpected. After 
reviewing the record, we find no substantial evid-
ence that the injury was not unexpected. It is clear 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the claimant 
that he experienced an unexpected and unanticip-
ated injury to his back as he lifted a crate of milk in 
the cramped area of the cooler. Although the 
claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had 
not complained of pain or limitations at his job with 
Kent's Foods. There is no evidence which indicates 
that this injury was predictable or that it developed 
gradually as with an occupational disease or pro-
gressive back disorder. While the employer's report 
of injury and the medical records do not corrobor-
ate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in 
the cooler, the reports are unhelpful in determining 
whether the injury was unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law judge ap-
plied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining 
an accident. We have rejected that test in lieu of a 
test based on unexpectedness. Moreover, the ad-
ministrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries 
is not determinative of whether an accident oc-
curred. We have previously held that the aggrava-
tion or "lighting up" of a preexisting condition by 
an internal failure is a compensable accident. 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude there-
fore that the decision of the Commission that the 
claimant's injury was not "by accident" was not 
based on the evidence, and that decision is, there-
fore, erroneous. 
[13] The key issue in this case, like most in-
ternal failure cases, is whether the injury "arose out 
of or in the course of *28 employment." Since the 
claimant had previous back problems, to meet the 
legal causation requirement he must show that 
moving and lifting several piles of dairy products 
weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area 
of the cooler exceeded the exertion that the average 
person typically undertakes in nonemployment life. 
The evidence presented by the claimant was insuffi-
cient for us to make a determination regarding legal 
causation. It is unclear from the record how many 
crates were moved by the claimant, the distance the 
crates were moved, the precise weight of the crates, 
and the size of the area in which the lifting and 
moving took place. Because the claimant did not 
have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we re-
mand for further fact-finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to show 
medical causation. It is unclear from the medical 
reports whether the doctors were aware of the spe-
cific incident in the cooler. Further, the case was 
not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. 
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, 
we are unable to determine whether there is a med-
ically demonstrable causal link between the lift in 
the cooler and the injury to the claimant's back. We 
therefore remand to the Industrial Commission for 
additional evidence and findings on the question of 
medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacated and 
remanded. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case to the Commis-
sion for the purpose of determining whether the 
work incident aggravated a preexisting condition 
such as would warrant an award of compensation. 
TKl
 However, I do not join the Court in adopting 
an "unexpected result" standard to be applied in de-
termining the existence of a compensable accident. 
FN1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 743 
(1967). 
I do not believe that this Court has 
"misconstrued the historical and logical" definition 
of "by accident" in the bulk of its recent cases con-
cerning the issue at bar. The majority's reliance 
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upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission 
™
2
 is misplaced. The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been simply ig-
nored.™3 The only case in which this Court fol-
lowed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt v. Industrial Com-
mission, FN4 which support is similarly without 
precedential value because it has also been ignored 
beginning with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler, FN5 
the very next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. In-
dustrial Commission FN6 and again defined 
"accident" as an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normally be ex-
pected to occur in the usual course of events. In my 
view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our post-war case law. 
FN2. 115 Utah 1,201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
FN3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez, 694 
P.2d 606 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-
Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1984); Billings Computer Corp. v. 
Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah 1982); Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981); Farmer's Grain Co-
operative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 
328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 
398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969); Carling v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 
P.2d 202 (1965). 
FN4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
FN5. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
FN6. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965) . 
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an 
injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the res-
ult of an injury." (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to establish 
policy, has chosen wording which precludes such 
an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer's 
dissent in Purity*29 Biscuit illustrates the short-
comings of the majority's interpretation. The word 
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may be used 
to denote both an unexpected occurrence which 
produces injury as well as an unexpected injury. 
The word "injury," on the other hand, denotes a res-
ult and not a cause. Had the legislature only used 
the word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986)), 
then that statute would cover all results regardless 
of the cause. Had the legislature only used the word 
"accident," then I would agree with the majority's 
holding today that the legislature intended to cover 
both the cause and the result. In fact, however, the 
legislature has used both words "injury" and 
"accident." It follows that the word "accident" must 
be interpreted as focusing upon the cause and not 
the result. In short, the majority's interpretation 
writes the word "injury" out of the statute. Such a 
decision is unwarranted in my view. 
The legislature recently amended section 
35-1-45,^ but chose to leave intact the standard 
which limits the payment of compensation to those 
injured "by accident arising out of or in the course 
of ... employment." FN8 Moreover, the singular 
"injury by accident" standard has not been altered 
or amended since its inception in 19 HP*9 The le-
gislature thus being satisfied with the Court's inter-
pretation of the term "accident" in the long line of 
cases beginning with Carling v. Industrial Commis-
sion, FNI° I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that term. 
FN7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 
1984 Utah Laws 610, 610. 
FN8. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl.Vol. 
4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1986). 
FN9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 
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52a, 1917 Utah Laws 306,322-23. 
FN10. 16 Utah 2d 260,399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I dissent. The majority defines the statutory 
term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," re-
gardless of whether it is produced by a usual or an 
unusual event. The majority also defines the term 
"arising out of or in the course of employment" to 
impose legal and medical causation requirements. 
SeeU.CA., 1953, §35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" 
has two different meanings, depending upon the 
physical condition of the worker at the time he is 
injured. A worker having no preexisting medical 
condition or handicap need only prove that the acci-
dent was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." 
But for congenitally handicapped persons and for 
persons who have suffered preexisting industrial in-
juries (which presumably have left the worker with 
some physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a worker 
may receive compensation only if the "employment 
contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater 
than that of nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove that his in-
ternal breakdown was caused by " an unusual or ex-
traordinary exertion'' in order to establish the re-
quisite legal causation, even though the majority 
opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual 
distinction as a means of proving causation." How 
the majority can reject that standard for persons 
having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that 
standard for persons with preexisting conditions, is 
baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which a worker 
with a preexisting condition must demonstrate and 
the "usual exertion" which a person with no preex-
isting condition must demonstrate is far from clear. 
The latter standard is to be judged with respect to 
the " 'normal nonemployment life of this or any 
other person.' " The Court emphasizes that the 
"precipitating exertion must be compared with the 
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemploy-
ment life, not the nonemployment life of the partic-
ular worker." What the term "usual wear and tear 
and exertions of nonemployment" means is not 
defined by the *30 majority. The few examples set 
out do little to explain the concept aimed at, other 
than to suggest that the term means something more 
than simple, life-sustaining activities. 
I wholly fail to understand why persons who 
have a preexisting condition should be placed in the 
disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless 
position, that the majority opinion imposes upon 
them. The purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to 
provide compensation for workers who have preex-
isting medical conditions and therefore run a great-
er risk of injury when they expose themselves to the 
hazards of the work place. But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than encour-
aging them to abandon the work force for some 
kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage em-
ployers to hire persons with preexisting conditions 
by spreading the risk throughout the industry to as-
sure such persons that their injuries will be cared 
for without imposing extraordinary liabilities on the 
employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting 
Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); 
McPhie v. United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to favor 
those policies which encourage people to work, 
rather than policies that deter employers from offer-
ing gainful employment to those who have a higher 
risk of work-related injury. There is little personal 
or social benefit from a policy that tends to discour-
age persons from working because of prior injuries 
or disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and flatly in-
consistent with the basic purposes of the workmen's 
compensation laws to impose higher standards for 
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compensation on those with preexisting medical 
conditions than on those without. Tort law gener-
ally does not do so. A defendant in a negligence ac-
tion is required to take the victim as the defendant 
finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the vic-
tim may have are disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not been, different 
in workmen's compensation law, which is really a 
substitute for tort law remedies. In short, handi-
capped or previously injured persons who are in-
jured by an industrial accident are simply discrim-
inated against by having to meet the majority's rig-
orous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an admin-
istrative law judge, the Industrial Commission, or 
an appellate court is supposed to determine what 
"typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's 
society," as they now must do for the purpose of 
determining legal causation for workers with preex-
isting medical conditions. Does that mean what a 
typical sixty-five-year-old does or a typical twenty-
one-year-old does during his or her nonemployment 
activities? Is it what a professional football player 
does in his leisure time or what a ballet dancer 
does? Is it what a sedentary worker does in his or 
her off-hours or what a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the 
majority provides examples which supposedly illus-
trate the unarticulated principle. The examples 
"include taking full garbage cans to the street, lift-
ing and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat 
tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest 
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings." These 
few examples, which I find to be arguable in any 
event since they reflect only what some people may 
do from time to time, do not substitute for a legal 
standard. I seriously wonder whether changing a 
flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in 
today's society, and I do not know how much lug-
gage the "typical" individual lifts or how far he or 
she carries it. The point is that the majority has not 
set forth a workable standard at all. In fact, I have 
serious doubt that such an artificial construct as 
"typical nonemployment activities" will produce 
more fair and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical" individual 
for the purpose of establishing a rational standard. 
Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, 
not to "average" people, and die law has always re-
cognized *31 as much. In short, I do not think that 
the majority's newly established standard will pro-
duce decisions one whit more consistent or rational 
than those produced in the past.™1 
FN1. In my view, the decisions of this 
Court are generally reconcilable with only 
a few glaring exceptions and most of them 
prior to 1980. That there are more incon-
sistencies the further back one goes in our 
body of law is not particularly unexpected. 
In any event, I doubt that the new approach 
will produce unwavering consistency over 
the years. 
The majority also holds that an injured person 
must prove that the disability is "medically the res-
ult of an exertion or injury that occurred during a 
work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I 
think is unwarranted, the majority states that "[t]he 
medical causal requirement will prevent an employ-
er from becoming a general insurer of his employ-
ees and discourage fraudulent claims." I am fearful 
that that hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the source 
of the Court's new standards and analysis, is highly 
acclaimed in this field of law, but there is much to 
be said for the case-by-case approach in hammering 
out legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion pro-
duce inconsistencies. I readily concede that present 
law needs to be rationalized and that some cases 
should be overruled because they are hopelessly in-
consistent with other cases, but I do not believe that 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a manner 
as to defeat those humane policies intended to al-
low for the injuries of workers who come to the 
work place in an impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. 
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